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press access, but seemed carefully to weigh conflicting arguments and evidence before ruling, appeared to make the
Court less willing to disturb his ruling.
2. Considerationof alternatives.The three judges in major
Supreme Court cases who did not consider alternatives to closure have been overruled.185 The Court seems to think alternatives should be investigated, even if it is reluctant to supply
a list of those that should be considered.
3. Reporters' conduct. When the initial motion for closure
was made in both Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, the
reporters present failed to object. Several Justices spoke of
their great reluctance to disturb rulings to which there had
been no timely objection. In most cases surveyed by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the reporters
present did not initially object. 156 Clearly many reporters have
not been aware of developments in this area of the law or
have been unsure of their standing to object. Although it is
unreasonable for courts to expect reporters to have legal
knowledge beyond that possessed by lay people who routinely
appear in court, reporters can best ensure that courtrooms
will not be arbitrarily closed by objecting at the time the closure motion is made and requesting that the judge state a reason for closing the courtroom.
LAWRENCE J. MORRIS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Privilege Against SelfIncrimination-Truthful Statements May Be Used in
a Perjury Prosecution. United States v. Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. 115 (1980). Two basic legal concepts sometimes
155. Each of the trial court judges in Sheppard, Nebraska Press and Richmond
Newspapers failed to consider alternatives to closure and each was overturned. While
the Court did not in Richmond Newspapers specifically point to the failure of Judge
Taylor to consider alternatives to closure, there appears to be a pattern that the
Court is more lenient when alternatives are considered (e.g., Gannett) than when

they are not.
156. Court Watch Study, Spring 1980.
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clash when a person is called on to testify. The first is that the
public has a right to every person's evidence.1 The second,
embodied in the fifth amendment, is that no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution. The latter relieves the witness from facing "the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt." 2 In order
to obtain testimony from a witness despite his assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the concept of immunity
was developed.3 This concept replaces the privilege with a
prohibition against use of the testimony, or any evidence derived from it, in a prosecution of the witness.4 The courts have
recognized an exception to this prohibition - a prosecution
for perjury committed while testifying under a grant of
5
immunity.
A question which often arises during a prosecution for perjury committed while under a grant of immunity is how much
of the defendant's compelled, truthful testimony is admissible
into evidence? There are many possible variations of this
problem, depending on the nature of the statements and the
use the prosecution makes of them. One of the most basic examples of the problem, however, was presented in United
6
States v. Apfelbaum.
Stanley Apfelbaum was an administrative assistant to the
district attorney of Philadelphia. A grand jury, investigating
an automobile dealership, called Apfelbaum to testify. It was
thought that he might be a party to a phony robbery. At first,
he claimed his fifth amendment privilege. The prosecutor
then obtained an order under 18 U.S.C. sections 6002-03,
granting Apfelbaum immunity and compelling his testimony.7
1. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-44 (1972).
2. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
3. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445-47; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
4. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). This is the general federal immunity statute. In
Kastigar,406 U.S. 441, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality. See notes 1416 and accompanying text infra for a general discussion of use and derivative use vs.
transactional immunity. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text infra for a discussion
of Kastigar.
5. Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911).
6. 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding
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Apfelbaum still refused to answer the questions. After spending six days in jail for civil contempt, Apfelbaum finally
agreed to testify. However, some of his testimony was
perjured.
Apfelbaum was indicted on two counts of perjury pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. section 1623. During his perjury trial, the prosecution used part of Apfelbaum's truthful grand jury testimony
related to the perjured statements.8 Apfelbaum objected to
the use of these truthful statements, claiming this violated his
privilege against self-incrimination. The district court overruled his objection, and the jury found him guilty. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and granted a new
trial based on the use of those truthful statements.9 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision. 10
An understanding of the issue in Apfetbaum requires some
familiarity with the background of immunity and with the
perjury exception to immunity.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Basically, immunity operates to supplant the fifth amendment privilege and compel self-incriminating testimony.11 Imbefore or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding
over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under
this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or
other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
8. United States v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d 1264, 1268 (3d Cir. 1978).
9. Id. at 1264-73.
10. 445 U.S. 115 (1980). See United States v. Apfelbaum, 621 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.
1980) for disposition of the case upon remand.
11. Immunity has become a valuable law enforcement tool, especially in dealing
with crimes in which the only witnesses who can supply essential evidence are often
themselves implicated in the crime. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446
(1972). For a discussion of the procedure for obtaining immunity and problems with
immunity, see Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems and Practices Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 275 (1976); see also Strachan, Self-In-
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munity statutes, in fact, predate the Constitution, 2 and, as
the Supreme Court has noted, have become "part of our constitutional fabric."13
There are several types of immunity: use, transactional,
and use and derivative use. Use immunity simply provides
that the compelled testimony of the witness cannot be introduced as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal trial."
Transactional immunity provides that the witness cannot be
prosecuted for any crime about which he testified while under
a grant of immunity.' 5 Use and derivative use immunity provides that the compelled testimony and any evidence derived
from that testimony may not be used against him in a subsequent prosecution. 6
Counselman v. Hitchcock tested the constitutionality of
use immunity. The Court found use immunity unconstitutional because it failed to protect against the derivative use of
the compelled testimony; that is, use of the testimony as a
lead to other incriminating evidence. "8 The Court stated that
Congress could not replace the privilege against self-incrimination with immunity unless that immunity was "so broad as
to have the same extent in scope and effect"'19 as the privilege
itself.
In its discussion, the Court went further and indicated
that only transactional immunity could provide the protection
necessarily coextensive with the privilege. The Court stated
that no immunity which left the party "subject to prosecution
after he answers the question put to him" would be adequate;
the witness needed "absolute immunity against future prose-

crimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. Rnv. 791 (1978). Professor
Strachan brings a special perspective to immunity problems because her husband,
Gordon Strachan, testified under a grant of immunity and was later indicted for his
activities in connection with the Watergate scandal.
12. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 456 (1979); Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 445 n.13.
13. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
14. Annot., 32 L.Ed.2d 869, 879-80 (1972).
15. Id. at 878-79.
16. Id. at 880-83. Use and derivative use immunity is sometimes referred to as
"use and fruits" immunity. Id. at 883.
17. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
18. Id. at 564.
19. Id. at 585.
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cution for the offense to which the question relates."2 0
Relying on the implication that transactional immunity
would be found constitutional, Congress and state legislatures
enacted transactional immunity statutes. These statutes were
upheld in Brown v. Walker.21 The Court noted that the privilege protected a person from being compelled to testify
against himself in a criminal prosecution. It found that if the
danger of such a prosecution was removed, the privilege
ceased to apply.2 2 The Court therefore upheld the use of
transactional immunity for the purpose of compelling self-incriminating testimony. It would be years before any attempts
to change this immunity were made.
By the 1960s, the government had grown dissatisfied with
the high price of transactional immunity and in 1964, by way
of dicta in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,1 the Court
implied that transactional immunity might not be necessary
and that a careful rereading of Counselman might be in order.
In Murphy, the defendant refused to answer the Waterfront
Commission's questions despite the state's grant of transactional immunity. He argued that he could still be prosecuted
in another state or under federal laws, and that his compelled
testimony could then be used to incriminate him. The Court
held that a state could compel such testimony, but that other
states and federal prosecutors would be prohibited from using
the testimony or evidence derived from such testimony in a
subsequent criminal prosecution of the witness. 24 In his concurring opinion,25 Justice White indicated the emerging attitude of the Court by stating: "Immunity must be as broad as,
but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege

against self-incrimination."2
The Court in Murphy implied that it might find a statute
providing use and derivative use immunity constitutional. The
commission working on the revision of the federal criminal
laws noted this implication and recommended a general use

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 585-86.
161 U.S. 591 (1896).
Id. at 597.
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Id.
Id. at 92 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 107.
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and derivative use immunity statute. 27 This proposed statute
included the traditional exception for perjury. 28
This theory became incorporated into legislation which
Congress eventually passed as part of the Organized Crime
Act of 1970. This provision is the present 18 U.S.C. section
6002.29 The prohibition still retains the perjury exception-"0
The committee reports and hearings provide only marginal
help in determining what exactly is included within the perjury exception. The committees, noting that the exception was
probably unnecessary because courts were quite likely to imply it, included it only out of caution.3 1 Comments in the legislative history do indicate that the perjury exception was to
apply to perjury committed in the course of testifying under
2
3
the immunity grant.

27. Tun NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, WORKING
PAPERS 1447 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CoMIssSIoN, WORKING PAPERS].
See 8 J. WiwMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2283 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Wigmore observes
that this is the type of immunity used in Canada, with no constitutional sanction.
28. NATIONAL COMMISSION, WORKING PAPERS, supra note 27, at 1421-32.

29. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
30. [B]ut no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1188,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970); Organized Crime Control Act: Hearings on S. 30
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
162 (1970) (comments of Rep. Biaggi). See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139
(1911).
32. H. R. Rep. 91-1188, supra note 31, at 7 (reason for change in wording was to
make it clear that the testimony can be used in a prosecution for perjury "committed
in response to an order to testify."); HearingsBefore Subcomm. No. 5, supranote 31,
at 145 (comments of Rep. Biaggi: "However, perjury and contempt while testifying
still remain in force against the witness."); 119 Cong. Rec. 36293 (1970) (remarks of
Sen. Hruska, co-sponsor, that the prohibition meant the testimony could not be used
for offenses committed prior to the testimony).
In connection with this, the court in In re Baldinger, 356 F. Supp. 153 (C.D. Cal.
1973) refused to issue an immunity grant because it construed the perjury exception
to mean the testimony could be used to prove perjury committed prior to the immunity grant. The court noted that all other immunity statutes had included the limitation on perjury while testifying under the order.Id. at 157. Thus, the court concluded that the immunity, in that case, would not protect the witness from use of her
testimony to prove prior false statements. This use, the court found, would be unconstitutional, so it refused to issue the order. However, the court in United States v.
Doe, 361 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Penn. 1973) and Application of the United States Senate
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Kastigar v. United States3 tested the constitutionality of
section 6002 and use and derivative use immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that both were constitutional. The
Court stated that the problem in Counselman had been that
the statute did not protect from derivative use; the other
broad language on transactional immunity had been unnecessary.34 The Court found that immunity must be as broad as
the privilege against self-incrimination, but need not be
broader. Transactional immunity was broader; use and derivative use immunity was coextensive with the privilege.35
In his majority opinion, Justice Powell asserted that use
and derivative use immunity was coextensive with the fifth
amendment protection, stating, "It prohibits the prosecutorial
authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead
to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.""6 This
statement would appear again in later perjury cases.

II.

PERJURY AND THE FiFTH AMENDMENT

Perjury committed while under a grant of immunity creates a certain degree of analytical confusion, whether the immunity is transactional or use and derivative use. There is a

Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1973)
rejected this construction of the statute and issued the immunity orders. Judge Sirice, in Senate Select Comm., noted that the Baldinger interpretation was "permissible" but not "necessary." Id. at 1283. He stated that he would follow the interpretation which rendered it constitutional and noted that it was "inconceivable that
Congress, in its attempt to devise a constitutionally sound use immunity statute,
should have intended or permitted exceptions to the use of compelled testimony
other than the obvious ones for offenses committed in the course of testimony." Id. at
1284. See Note, Statutory Immunity and the Perjury Exception, 10 CAL. W. L. REv.
428 (1974).
Also note that the reason for including the language, "or otherwise failing to comply with the order," in § 6002 was probably to insure that the testimony could be
used in a contempt prosecution. Whether the perjury exception, absent that language,
permitted such use for contempt proceeding was an issue in United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323 (1950). The Court concluded such use was implied in the statute.
33. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
34. Id. at 453-54.
35. Id. at 453. For discussion on the Burger Court's narrow view of the privilege
and focus on the use of compelled testimony rather than on the act of compulsion,
see Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's
Definition, 61 MIss.L. REv. 383 (1977).
36. 406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
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tendency to forget that, in such a case, the testimony itself is
the crime. "There is justifiable reason for the perjury exception. The crime consists of the testimony itself, without which
37
'
no prosecution is possible.
The courts have used various theories to justify the exception which allows prosecution of a witness who perjures himself under an immunity grant and permits the use of his immunized testimony in a perjury prosecution. One theory uses
a chronological distinction - only prior crimes are protected
by the fifth amendment. 8 Since the witness has not testified
at the time immunity is granted, his subsequent perjury is unprotected. Another theory views immunity as a bargain or exchange. Perjury violates the terms of that bargain. Because of
this breach of the bargain, the perjured testimony is not immunized.3 9 At other times, the courts do not really go into
such analysis but seem to rely more on common sense. Perjured immunized testimony would destroy the whole purpose
of immunity.' ° That purpose is to gain access to otherwise unavailable information. The courts also have noted that the
fifth amendment protects the right not to answer questions,
41
not the right to answer falsely.
Whatever the justification used, the courts have recognized
the perjury exception. In Glickstein v. United States,42 the
Supreme Court found that the perjury exception to immunity
was "not open to controversy,"' 3 noting that (1) the fifth
amendment does not prohibit the government from compelling testimony, provided that immunity coextensive with the
privilege is supplied, and (2) the sanction of an oath and imposition of punishment was part of the power to compel testi-

37. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 347 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). See 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2282, "for the perjured utterance is not 'evidence' or 'testi-

mony' to a crime but is the very act of the crime itself."
38. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); Daniels v. United
States, 196 F. 459 (6th Cir. 1912).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d 1264 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Hockenberry, 474 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1973).
40. See, e.g., Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911); Edelstein v. United
States, 149 F. 636 (8th Cir. 1906).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); Bryson v. United States,
396 U.S. 64 (1969).
42. 222 U.S. 139 (1911).
43. Id. at 141.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:744

mony. As the Court stated, "In other words, this is but to say
that an authority which can only extend to the licensing of
44
perjury is not a power to compel the giving of testimony."
The Court relied on a common sense interpretation of the
fifth amendment and the immunity statute, but it also relied
on the chronological argument. Immunity related to past
crimes, not to perjury that the witness might commit after obtaining immunity.45 The Court, in conclusion, recognized the
validity of the perjury exception even when not expressed in
the statute and allowed the use of the immunized testimony
in the perjury prosecution.4" No issue was raised concerning
truthful versus false immunized statements, and the Court appeared to make no such distinction.
In more recent cases, the Court has continued to hold that
the fifth amendment does not protect perjury, even when the
perjury is committed under extenuating circumstances. 7 In
one case, Marchetti v. United States,"8 the Court questioned
the chronological theory - that the fifth amendment only
protects the witness from revealing self-incriminatory information for past, not future, crimes. The Court held that fail-

44. Id. at 142.
45. Id.
46. Accord, Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636 (8th Cir. 1906). The court
reached this conclusion in a bankruptcy case prior to the decision in Glickstein. In
reaching this conclusion, the court in Edelstein relied on the chronological theory, the
common sense theory, and the breach of immunity bargain theory. Id. at 642-44.
In United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950), the Court used the chronological
theory to find that the testimony could be used in a contempt proceeding despite the
absence of an explicit provision for this in the statute. See n.32 supra.
47. In Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969), the defendant filed a false
affidavit with the NLRB, saying he was not a member of the Communist Party. Although the Court questioned the constitutionality of the statute requiring such affidavits, it found that this was no excuse for lying. "A citizen may decline to answer the
question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully
answer with a falsehood." Id. at 72.
In United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), the issue was whether a
grand jury witness could be prosecuted for perjury when he had not been given full
Miranda warnings before testifying. In the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger
observed that "[iun this constitutional process of securing a witness' testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant
affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings." Id. at 576.
The Court took the same view in a later case where the witness, because of language difficulties, did not understand her right not to answer and lied instead. United
States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977).
48. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).

SELF-INCRIMINATION

1981]

ure to file federal wagering tax forms and assertion of the fifth
amendment right not to answer questions on these forms was
permissible because information called for on the forms was
incriminating. The information obtained might reveal plans
for future gambling.4
In ruling that the privilege against self-incrimination did
provide protection for future crimes in this case, the Court
declared that it refused to be bound by rigid chronological
distinctions, that the privilege was not that narrow. Rather,
the true test of its applicability was whether the person faced
real and not imaginary dangers of self-incrimination. " The
Court noted, that in the vast majority of situations, the privilege would not provide prospective protection, but that the
situation differed in this case because of a full array of state
and federal gambling prohibitions which the defendant faced.
It concluded that "it is not mere time to which the law must
look, but the substantiality of the risks of incrimination."5 1
So, in at least some cases, the chronological theory used to
support the perjury exception may not hold true. Usually,
however, the courts have held that the fifth amendment does
not supply 2 "insulation for a career of crime about to be
launched.

5'

The perjury exception to immunity, whether rationalized
on the basis of a breach of the immunity bargain theory, common sense, or the proposition that the fifth amendment protects neither perjury nor incrimination for future crimes, is
well established as constitutional. The Court appears to have
taken a very stern approach to perjury. The question then becomes how much of the immunized testimony can be used in a
perjury trial and for what purposes. Until Apfelbaum, the Supreme Court had not dealt directly with this issue. Two decisions of the courts of appeals, however, are especially helpful
49. Id. at 52.
50. Id. at 53-54; Brown, 161 U.S. at 600.
51. 390 U.S. at 54.
52. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971). This case concerned whether
the National Firearms Act, 28 U.S.C. § 5845, requiring registration while providing
use and derivative use immunity for the information obtained as far as prior and
concurrent criminal acts were concerned, violated the privilege since it did not protect from use in prosecutions for future criminal acts. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, concluded it did not. Justice Brennan (concurring) also agreed that immunity
for future crimes was not required. Id. at 611.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:744

in understanding Apfelbaum.
In Daniels v. United States,5 the court dealt with perjury
committed during the defendant's bankruptcy proceeding. At
the perjury trial, the government introduced truthful portions
of the defendant's immunized testimony to prove he knowingly lied as part of a scheme to defraud his creditors.
The court found that the truthful statements were relevant to the perjury prosecution and, therefore, admissible. It
asserted that the immunity only applied to past crimes and
that "it is manifest that, where the bankrupt is indicted for
testifying falsely in one part of his examination, his testimony
in other parts of the same examination, if tending to support
the indictment, may be given in evidence against him. ' 4 The
court refused to draw an arbitrary line between perjurious
statements and truthful statements, stating that the testimony "must, for the present purpose, be considered as an entirety . .

.55

Contrast this view with that of the Third Circuit in the
more recent case, United States v. Hockenberry." In Hockenberry, on cross examination in a perjury trial, the prosecution
used truthful portions of a former county detective's immunized testimony to impeach his credibility. These were defendant's admissions that he had falsified affidavits for search
warrants on several occasions. The court found that using
these truthful admissions of prior wrongdoing, unrelated to
the perjured testimony, violated the terms of the defendant's
immunity and his fifth amendment privilege. They did not
fall within the exception for perjury.57 The court concluded
that the truthful statements were, indeed, compelled testimony. Perjured testimony was not compelled. Immunity applied to incriminating truth, but not to falsehoods. Therefore,
the prosecution could use only the false statements and a
minimal amount of truthful statements necessary to establish
the corpus delicti of the offense in a subsequent perjury prosecution. 58 To use more would violate the defendant's constitu-

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

196 F. 459 (6th Cir. 1912).
Id. at 463.
Id.
474 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 249.
Id.
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tional rights.
The court in Hockenberry seemed to rely on a variation of
the bargain theory used to justify the perjury exception to immunity. The court made a rigid distinction between compelled
truthful statements and falsehoods, which it asserted were not
compelled. False statements could be used in the perjury trial;
truthful ones could not. The court's reasoning appears at least
somewhat confusing. In essence, it requires a determination of
the truthfulness or falsity of a statement before the perjury
trial." Also noteworthy is that the court in Hockenberry never
mentioned the decision in Daniels. The court could have distinguished the fact situation in Hockenberry from that in
Daniels in that the former involved the use of truthful admissions in order to impeach the defendant's credibility, while
the latter involved the use of truthful statements directly related to the perjured statements. The court in Hockenberry,
however, did not do this. Under the broad rule which the
court announced in Hockenberry - that truthful statements
could not be used in a subsequent perjury prosecution - the
opposite result would have occurred in Daniels. Despite any
logical problems with the Hockenberry rule, the Third Circuit
and other circuits proceeded to cite this rule in a variety of
0
different fact situations.6
IH. United States v. Apfelbaum
In 1978, following the rule set forth in Hockenberry, the
Third Circuit reversed Stanley Apfelbaum's perjury conviction and granted him a new trial.61 The court followed the
reasoning that truthful statements were compelled and could
not be used in the perjury prosecution. The court had to define what it had meant by corpus delicti in Hockenberry, and
defined it to include the statements alleged to be perjurious
and no more than the minimal testimony essential to place
the charged falsehood into context. All the testimony constituting the corpus delicti had to be incorporated in the indictment.2 The related truthful statements the prosecution had
59. Strachan, Self-Incrimination,Immunity, and Watergate, 56 Tax. L. Rlv. 791,
809 n.83 (1978).
60. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text infra.
61. United States v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d 1264 (3d Cir. 1978).
62. Id. at 1270, n.9.
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used in Apfelbaum's trial were not part of the corpus delicti.
The court rejected the government's argument, similar to the
reasoning in Daniels, that the statements were admissible because they were relevant to the perjury charge. 3 The court
also relied on the statements in Kastigar justifying use and
derivative use immunity because of the prohibition against
use of compelled testimony "in any respect.""
The Supreme Court reversed. 5 In the opinion, the Court
noted the confusion on the use of truthful immunized statements in perjury prosecutions and the different approaches of
the various circuits. 6 It also acknowledged somewhat conflicting statements in two lines of its own opinions - those in the
Counselman and Kastigar line (especially the statement in
Kastigarthat the prosecution cannot use compelled testimony
in "any respect") and, apparently, those in the perjury line of
67
cases such as Glickstein
The Court then proceeded to define two key issues in Apfelbaum: (1) whether section 6002 permitted the use of truthful statements in a perjury prosecution; and (2) whether the
fifth amendment permitted such use. It found no support for
Apfelbaum's contention, either in the plain language of the
statute or in its legislative history, that truthful statements
cannot be used in a perjury prosecution."' It noted that the
statute makes no distinction between truthful and false statements in the perjury exception. The Court observed that the
legislative purpose for the Organized Crime Act of 1970 was to
strengthen evidence-gathering tools and, therefore, concluded
that Congress intended the perjury exception "to be interpreted as broadly as constitutionally permissible."' 9
In analyzing the fifth amendment issue, the Court stated
that the lower court erred in equating the protection the fifth
amendment afforded with the effect of remaining silent. Such

63. Id. at 1271.
64. Id. at 1269, quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
65. 445 U.S. 115 (1980). The Court was unanimous in the decision to reverse. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion; Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion; Justice Blackmun also wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall
joined.
66. 445 U.S. at 119 n.5.
67. Id. at 120-21 and n.6.
68. Id. at 121.
69. Id. at 121-23 and n.7. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
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an analysis would not only bar any prosecution for perjury,
the Court observed, but would also bar the compulsion of testimony under any kind of immunity grant because immunity
would not prevent, for example, the use of compelled testimony in a civil procedure. The Court rejected such a "butfor" analysis.7 0 Constitutional immunity grants "need not
treat the witness as if he had remained silent.''
One difference between the effect of remaining silent and
the effect of testifying under immunity is, of course, the possibility of a perjury prosecution. The Court relied on the cases
involving perjury, discussed earlier, to conclude that the fifth
amendment does not protect perjury. Indeed, the Court found
that the "statement has been so often repeated ... as to be
firmly established constitutional law."'7 2 Therefore, prosecutions for perjury committed while testifying under immunity
are permissible, and the Court found "no principle or decision
that limits the admissibility of evidence in a manner peculiar
only to them. '73 This is still a narrow exception because the
testimony remains inadmissible in any prosecution for any
other crimes committed prior to immunity.
The Court then discussed the chronological justification
for the perjury exception. It stated that the test for applicability of fifth amendment protection is whether the witness is
faced with a substantial and real danger of incrimination. 4
The Court acknowledged that Marchetti had somewhat abolished the rigid chronological distinction. But the Court found
that in most cases, including this one, the danger of incrimination was not substantial enough for the fifth amendment to
protect the witness in the event he proceeded to lie while
under immunity."5 The Court found that Apfelbaum's perjury
was in the future when immunity was granted. 8
The Court then held that immunized truthful statements

70. 445 U.S. at 124-26.
71. Id. at 127.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 128.
74. Id. [quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968), where the
Court cited Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951) and Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896)].
75. Id. at 129-30.
76. Id. at 131.
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could be used in a perjury prosecution if they conformed to
other rules of evidence. It concluded, "The exception of a perjury prosecution from the prohibition against the use of immunized testimony may be a narrow one, but it is also a com'7
plete one."
Justice Brennan, in his brief concurring opinion, agreed
with the reversal of the court of appeals decision.7 8 He based
this on several propositions. First, the fifth amendment does
not condone perjury. Second, it requires a grant of immunity
to place the witness in a position "similar" to the one he
would have been in had he exercised the privilege. This does
not bar a perjury prosecution because the privilege does not
protect false testimony. Also, to hold that it does bar such a
prosecution would destroy the whole purpose of immunity.
These propositions, he declared, were sufficient to decide this
issue - that the prosecution could use truthful statements
"to prove elements of the offense of perjury."9
Brennan believed that the rest of the Court's opinion went
too far. He was not prepared to say there were no constraints
on other uses of truthful statements in a perjury prosecution.
He also expressed doubt that the result would be the same if
the perjury occurred sometime after the immunized testimony. He characterized any such implications in the Court's
opinion as dictaY'
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion,81 also
doubted that there were no special rules governing the admissibility of immunized testimony at a perjury trial.2 He, too,
was troubled because the Court failed to distinguish between
a prosecution for perjury committed while testifying under
immunity and perjury committed at some other time. 3 Fur-

77. Id. at 131-32.
78. Id. at 132 (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 132-33.
81. Id. at 133 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. It is not clear whether the Court's opinion contemplated such use. However, it
would not seem to allow such use for perjury committed priorto the immunity grant.
Such use would probably violate the fifth amendment. Moreover, the opinion, given
its statements that immunity and the fifth amendment cover past, not future, crimes;
implicitly seems to disapprove of such use to prove past perjury. Id. at 129-32. See
note 32 supra; United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973).
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thermore, Blackmun thought that how the testimony was
used might require special analysis, mentioning the use of
truthful admissions of prior perjury.' Although he did not
cite Hockenberry, he seemed to refer to the situation there where the admissions of prior false statements were used to
impeach the defendant's credibility.
Blackmun's most serious disagreement with the majority
concerned its distinction between the protection of the privilege and the effect of invoking it. 5 He noted that the "privilege is defined in terms of its incriminating effect ..... 8 He
agreed immunity need not exactly duplicate this effect, but
felt the comparison between silence and immunity often could
be useful.
Nevertheless, Blackmun concluded that the court of appeals had too narrowly confined the use of immunized testimony. 17 Perjury violated the immunity bargain, and the fifth
amendment did not protect perjury. Thus, reversal was
required."

IV.

ANALYSIS

The use of truthful immunized testimony in Apfelbaum
does seem to fall into the narrow exception to immunity. It
was a prosecution for perjury in the course of immunized testimony. The truthful testimony was closely related to the false
testimony. In fact, it does appear that it was used mainly to
prove the elements of the crime. Thus, the case more closely
resembles Daniels than Hockenberry. It is important to keep
the exact fact situation in mind when analyzing the Supreme
Court's decision.
There are problems with certain broad statements in the
Court's opinion if they are applied to fact situations differing
from Apfelbaum. The Court finds that there is no need for
special analysis concerning the admissibility of truthful immunized testimony.89 Both Brennan and Blackmun, however,
point to valid considerations which may require such special
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

445 U.S. at 134 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 135.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 135.
445 U.S. at 128.
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analysis - when the perjury occurred and how the truthful
testimony is used. There seem to be a number of chronological
combinations of perjury and immunity: perjury, then immunized testimony; perjury in the course of immunized testimony (Apfelbaum); immunized testimony, then perjury. Complicating things further is a prosecution for inconsistent
declarations, where the government need not prove which of
the two statements is falseY' There is also the possibility that
the witness's truthful statements might be used for impeachment purposes in any of these situations. Special analysis may
be called for, and the comparison of the effect of silence versus immunity may then be appropriate.
It is the failure of the Court to distinguish Apfelbaum
from these other possibilities which is somewhat troubling
and confusing. This failure is particularly noticeable in its
footnote analysis of the different positions that the various
circuits have taken on this issue.9 1 Referring to these cases,
one finds that the fact situations do differ from that in
Apfelbaum.
The Court's failure to distinguish the differences in these
cases, noted in its footnote, however, does not match the failure of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to do so.
The court of appeals, to a large degree, relied on these cases in
making its decision in Apfelbaum. Other than the cases from
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, 92 none of the cases really in-

volved a situation analogous to Apfelbaum. Each case often
relied on the others decided before it for authority, often citing to dicta. The real origin of their rationale appears rooted
in Hockenberry and its theory that false testimony was not
immunized, but truthful testimony was. Hockenberry, as
noted earlier, can be distinguished from "the situation in Apfelbaum. A review of some of these cases reveals not only their
differences from Apfelbaum, but also the need for special
analysis of these other issues.
These situations included the use of immunized testimony
to prove perjury under a prior grant of immunity;93 as the ba90. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1976).
91. 445 U.S. at 119-20 n.5.
92. United States v. Daniels, 196 F. 459 (6th Cir. 1912); Edelstein v. United
States, 149 F. 636 (8th Cir. 1906).
93. United States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977). The defendant had
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sis for an inconsistent declarations prosecution, where the
state need not prove which statement - earlier or later, immunized or not immunized - is false;" or for impeachment
purposes.9 5 One other difficulty is that many of these cases
testified under immunity before a grand jury, leading to the indictments of several
others. At their trial, the defendant refused to answer despite a second grant of immunity. He argued that his truthful testimony then could be used to convict him of
perjury in the earlier testimony. The court found that truthful immunized testimony
could not be used to prove either an earlier or later perjury. The perjury exception
only applied to false testimony which was not immunized.
94. Id. at 28-29. See also United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977), where a witness refused to answer questions while
under immunity for fear his answers could be used with prior statements as the basis
for an inconsistent declarations prosecution. The court found that such a prosecution
would not be possible. The perjury exception, it concluded, applied only to future
perjury, not for statements made prior to the latest grant of immunity. To permit an
inconsistent declarations prosecution violated the exception because of the possibility
that the immunized testimony was true and the prior statements were false. Id. at
385-86. In United States v. Dunn, 577 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 100 (1979), the court allowed such a prosecution. However, this was
because the defendant had admitted, at a hearing on his indictment, that his immunized testimony was false. Thus, the court admitted it did not really decide if immunized statements could be used as the basis of an inconsistent declarations indictment. Id. at 125-26. In United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 970 (1977), the court noted, by way of dicta, that a prosecution for a contradiction between immunized testimony and subsequent testimony would not stand up
because the immunized testimony would not be admissible until it was shown to be
false. Id. at 823. The court there upheld a witness's refusal to answer questions at a
subsequent trial (not under immunity) for fear that this subsequent testimony could
be used to prove the prior immunized testimony was perjured. This view that immunized testimony is not admissible until proven false seems also to bar its use to prove
subsequent perjury. Accord, Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710 (1914).
95. United States v. Frumento, 552 F.2d .534 (3d Cir. 1977). In Frumento, the
court upheld a witness's contempt conviction, rejecting his argument that his immunized statements might be used to impeach his credibility in a future criminal prosecution. The court held that this use of truthful statements was not allowed. Id. at
542-43. Accord, United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1980). However, following the view that false statements are not immunized, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has allowed impeachment use of immunized testimony which the
defendant admits, or the court concludes, was false in a subsequent criminal prosecution - not limiting such use only to perjury prosecutions. See also United States v.
Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (false immunized testimony used for impeachment in trial for perjury committed after immunized testimony); United States v. Moss, 562 F.2d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) (immunized testimony used for impeachment in cross
examination, then defendant admitted it was false); cf. United States v. Kurzer, 534
F.2d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1976) (government's contention that some of immunized testimony was false does not abrogate immunity and permit use of all the testimony as
basis for a criminal prosecution). The Supreme Court may have resolved this issue in
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (plurality opinion) when it ruled that
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involved appeals from contempt convictions, where the defendants refused to answer despite immunity because they feared
the state might make some use of their testimony."' The
court, in a sense, then had to rule on the constitutionality of a
hypothetical situation. If the defendants' propositions were
possible and unconstitutional, then they were justified in refusing to testify. Again, Apfelbaum differed from these in that
it involved the actual use of immunized testimony rather than
just a feared possible use. This might have made Apfelbaum
easier to resolve than the other cases.
The Supreme Court, in Apfelbaum, wanted to clear up the
confusion and differing approaches in these cases. 9 7 It failed
to do this clearly. These cases, presenting issues not quite the
same as those in Apfelbaum, support Blackmun's and Brennan's view that special analysis of them may be needed. The
many possible combinations of perjury and immunity, coupled
with variations as to the time of each and the use to be made
of the testimony, do not lend themselves to easy answers.
In contrast to some of these other situations, the Apfelbaum situation seems simpler to resolve. The question is
whether the Court's broad statements in Apfelbaum will be
applied to these differing situations. One could readily distinguish these other situations from Apfelbaum. The Court's
troubling broad statements in Apfelbaum could easily be
characterized as dicta, as the concurring opinions noted. The
question of whether this will be done or whether the Court's
opinion will be broadly applied to all kinds of immunity-perjury situations remains unanswered. 8
REBECCA LEAIR

immunized testimony could not be used for impeachment in a subsequent trial for
misconduct in office and extortion by a public official. The Court made no distinction
between false and truthful statements. Since that was not an issue there, it is not
totally clear whether this prohibits such use of false statements.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Frumento, 552 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).

97. 445 U.S. at 119 and n.5.
98. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Horak, 625 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1980) provides
some clue as to the courts' likely reluctance to apply Apfelbaum to different situations. That case, decided after the Supreme Court's decision in Apfelbaum, involved

a grand jury witness who refused to testify despite immunity. Defendant argued that
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his immunized testimony could be used to convict him of giving false testimony at an
earlier time. The court rejected this. Id. at 770. In a footnote, the court found that
Apfelbaum held that the state could use truthful and false immunized testimony in a
perjury trial if the fifth amendment did not prohibit such use. Id. at 770 n.2. Ironically, that was the very issue the Court sought to clarify in Apfelbaum.
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